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1. Introduction  
 
More  than  a  year  after  it  started  in  Greece  and  later  on  spread  to  three  other  peripheral 
countries, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
2, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area  still goes on. 
True, significant steps have been taken to resolve the  predicament. Crisis mechanisms have 
been set up by the EU (the European Financial Stability Mechanism - EFSM) and by the euro 
area (the European Financial Stability Facility - EFSF), and financial assistance has been provided 
to Greece and Ireland. Governments in these and other affected countries have implemented 
severe austerity measures and started to put in place structural reform programmes. And the 
European Central Bank ( ECB)  has embarked on  a  (controversial)  peripheral sovereign debt 
purchase  programme, while continuing its earlier support to   euro-area banks  with ample 
liquidity provision.  
 
But these measures have not been sufficient to restore calm in markets. In early February 2011, 
spreads on 10-year government bonds issued by Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain  are all 
higher than they were in April 2010, before rescue measures started to be implemented.  
 
There are three reasons why European policies have been insufficient to solve the problem:  
  First, they have failed to recognise the possibility of insolvency and have addressed all 
crises as if they were purely liquidity crises. 
  Second, they have failed to address in a systemic way the interdependence between 
banking and sovereign crises and the interdependence across countries.  
  Third, they have been mostly reactive rather than proactive, thereby squandering their 
initially strong credibility by a series of partial, inadequate and belated responses.  
 
                                                           
1 We are grateful to colleagues within and outside Bruegel for comments on earlier versions of this paper and to 
Christophe Gouardo for excellent research assistance.  
2 Our criterion for focusing on these countries is the level of interest-rate spreads on long-term government bonds. 
We could have spoken of “high-spread countries”.  2 
 
To restore market stability and regain credibility a swift, radical and comprehensive solution is 
now needed. Such a strategy must comprise of three components: fostering adjustment and 
growth  by  promoting  budgetary  consolidation  and  competitiveness-enhancing  domestic 
reforms in peripheral countries; restructuring of public debt where needed; and restructuring of 
banks where needed. The purpose of this paper is to outline what this strategy could be.    
 
2. The sovereign debt nexus 
 
In many ways the four peripheral countries share common traits. Since the run-up to the euro 
and especially after joining the euro area, they have spent and lived beyond their means by 
accumulating private and/or public debt and running large current account deficits. Nominal 
wages have also grown significantly more than justified by productivity performance, resulting 
in prices growing too fast in comparison to the rest of the euro area (Figure 1). In some cases 
(Ireland)  price  divergence  essentially  took  place  in  the  non-traded  sector  –  especially 
construction  and  services  –  whereas  in  other  countries  the  traded  sector  –  especially 
manufacturing – was also affected. Such behaviours, and the policies that made them possible, 
were fundamentally incoherent with participation in the single European currency.  
 
In the last two years adjustment has started in all these countries and major policy measures 
have been taken in the course of 2010. Results are already visible in Ireland.  
Figure 1. Unit labour cost developments  1999Q1-2010Q3 (2000Q1=100) 
90
100
110
120
130
140
90
100
110
120
130
140
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Greece Ireland Portugal
Spain Germany
Business sector excl. agriculture
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Manufacturing
 
Source: Bruegel calculations with OECD data 
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As argued by Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010), however, the Greek crisis stands apart 
from  the  crises  in  the other  peripheral  countries.  First,  the  Greek  public  debt  predicament 
originates mainly in the mismanagement of public finances, while problems with banks have 
played a secondary role only. Second, with a debt-to-GDP ratio scheduled to reach 150 % in 
2011  and  to  continue  rising  in  subsequent  years,  the  country  is  clearly  on  the  verge  of 
insolvency. By contrast, in Spain and Ireland, a major reason for solvency concerns arises from 
the public finance consequences of private-sector debt accumulation, not least because of the 
cost of rescuing insolvent banks. Furthermore, public debt levels in these two countries and in 
Portugal are more manageable (with levels in 2011 remaining below 70, 90 and 110 % of GDP, 
respectively, in Spain, Portugal and Ireland) than in Greece.  
 
This assessment is confirmed by a forward-looking evaluation of the public debt situation in the 
four countries (Box 1). Under Consensus Economics forecasts as regards nominal GDP growth 
and  an optimistic  evolution  of  market  interest rates  (in  the  case  of  Greece,  a  reduction  of 
spreads vis-à-vis Germany from 970 basis points today to 350 in 2014), the adjustment needs 
are of frightening magnitude, not only in Greece but also in Ireland. This is even truer under 
more cautious assumptions for growth and interest rates (Figure 2).      
 Box 1: Sustainability assessment  
In order to assess fiscal sustainability, we examine two scenarios: 
  Optimistic scenario:  
o  Interest rate spreads against German Bunds are optimistically assumed to fall from the 
current high levels to 350 bps in Greece, 200 bps in Ireland, 150 bps in Portugal and 100 
bps in Spain by 2014 and are assumed to stay at these levels.  
o  GDP growth assumptions are derived on the basis of Consensus Economic forecasts; 
  Cautious scenario:  
o  Interest rate spreads against Germany do not fall as much as assumed in the optimistic 
scenario (we use the expectation hypothesis of the term structure to estimate the 
expected future interest rates). 
o  Especially in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, where the business climate is weak 
and where we see serious competitiveness problems, efforts to regain competitiveness 
are assumed to impact growth and inflation negatively compared to the previous 
scenario (Table B1); 
In both scenarios we use estimates from Barclays Capital on potential additional bank recapitalisation by 
governments. For Ireland and Spain we use their high-risk estimate, but for Greece and Portugal we use 
the benchmark as Barclays does not report high-risk estimates for these countries. The corresponding 
public finance cost amounts to € 10 bn in Greece, € 31.5 bn in Ireland, € 10 bn in Portugal and € 75 bn in 
Spain. We take into account the fact that the Irish government has put aside € 17.5 billion from its cash 
reserves and liquid assets to support banks. The Spanish value does not include support already provided 
by the government. We do not assume any privatisation revenue in order to remain on the conservative 
side. 4 
 
The primary balance (in percentage of GDP) in Greece and Ireland is assumed to evolve according to the 
EU-IMF programme assumptions as indicated in the IMF country reports published in December 2010. 
For Portugal and Spain we use the November 2010 forecast of the European Commission up to 2012, and 
assume that the primary balance will improve by 1.5 percentage point of GDP both in 2013 and 2014. 
With the above assumptions, we calculated the persistent primary balance needed from 2015 onwards 
in order to (a) stabilise the debt/GDP ratio at its 2015 level, (b) reduce the debt/GDP ratio from its 
simulated 2014 level to 60 percent of GDP (the Maastricht criterion) by 2034. 
Darvas, Gouardo, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011) present the detailed assumptions and calculations. 
Table B1. GDP growth assumptions for the sustainability analysis 
scenario
Real GDP 
gorwth
GDP 
deflator
Nominal 
GDP 
growth
Real GDP 
gorwth
GDP 
deflator
Nominal 
GDP 
growth
Greece Optimistic 0.8 0.9 1.6 2.3 2.0 4.3
Cautious 0.1 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 2.0
Ireland Optimistic 2.4 1.4 3.8 2.9 1.9 4.8
Cautious 2.0 1.1 3.2 2.5 1.5 4.0
Portugal Optimistic 1.2 1.4 2.5 1.9 1.9 3.8
Cautious 0.6 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.0 2.0
Spain Optimistic 1.4 1.5 3.0 2.0 1.8 3.8
Cautious 0.9 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.0 2.0
2016-20 2011-15
 
Source: Consensus Economics and Bruegel assumptions 
 
Figure 2. Primary balance adjustment needs between 2010 and 2015 (% GDP) under different 
macroeconomic scenarios and different debt stabilization objectives 
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Source: Bruegel. 5 
 
Note: the 2010 primary balances were -3.7% in Greece, -9.6% in Ireland (excluding bank support), -4.4% 
in Portugal and -7.3% in Spain. The stabilised levels of debts in the case of the adjustment indicated by 
the blue part of the bars are the following: 160% in Greece, 123% in Ireland, 98% in Portugal and 84% in 
Spain. 
 
It is not only the size of the adjustment effort that matters. The key indicator for assessing 
solvency is the size of the primary budget surplus that needs to be maintained over a period of 
years to achieve, in the medium term, a gradual return of the public debt to safe levels. Here 
the numbers for Greece stand apart from those for other countries. Even under the optimistic 
scenario, the primary surplus required to reduce the debt ratio to 60 per cent of GDP in twenty 
years would be 8.4 per cent of GDP. It would reach 14.5 per cent of GDP under the cautious 
scenario. This would imply devoting between one-fifth and one-third of tax revenues to interest 
payments on the public debt. Over the last 50 years, no country in the OECD (except Norway, 
thanks to oil surpluses) has ever sustained a primary surplus above 6 per cent of GDP. Even less 
ambitious targets would require politically unrealistic surpluses.
3  
 
Our conclusion therefore is that Greece has become insolvent and that further lending without 
a significant enough debt reduction is not a viable strategy. This conclusion does not apply to 
Ireland which  also needs to carry out a major budgetary adjustment but where the primary 
surplus required to keep the debt ratio at sustainable level remains within the range of what has 
been achieved in historical experience.
4    
 
So far, however, the possibility of restructuring  the Greek sovereign debt has been met with 
complete opposition on the part of euro area countries. The main argument seems to be that it 
could create a contagion effect throughout the area since much of the Greek debt is held 
outside the country but within the euro area. The concern is mainly about banks in core euro 
area countries (mainly France and Germany) that invested heavily in higher-yielding peripheral 
bonds. 
 
Preference for postponement is also likely supported by a ‘wait and see’ attitude: On the one 
hand, it is hoped that Greek reforms will transform the economy, putting it on a faster-track 
                                                           
3 As in many countries the Greek state has assets as well as liabilities, including significant holdings of land. These 
could potentially serve as collateral to guarantee loans but even a major divestiture of public property would be 
insufficient to modify the conclusion.    
4 Considering the status quo, e.g. current official lending rates to Ireland, 3.7 percent persistent primary surplus 
would be needed from 2015 in the optimistic scenario and 6.1 percent in the cautious scenario to reduce the debt 
ratio to 60 percent from 2014 to 2034, according to our calculations. See Table 1 for the impact of possible policies 
and a fall in market interest rates on these results. 6 
 
growth path, thereby alleviating the public finance situation; on the other hand, it is hoped that 
time would help weaker banks in the euro area to restore solvency, and make them better able 
to weather restructuring at a later point in time.  
 
History suggests, however, that such a ‘wait and see’ approach is a dubious strategy. Although 
clearly desirable, reforms and growth acceleration are hard and time-consuming processes. And 
the lingering threat of restructuring is likely to be economically and financially damaging for the 
economy.  Moreover, as official creditors - EU partners and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)  -  are  gradually  substituting  private  creditors  to  Greece,  postponing  the  restructuring 
would imply, to keep the debt ratio at sustainable levels, either a restructuring of official loans, 
or a significantly higher eventual haircut on private claims.          
 
3. Assessing the soft options 
 
To be fair, the official EU community has moved away from complete denial about the Greek 
debt  situation  and  is  now  looking  for  a  middle  way  between  adjustment  only  and  debt 
restructuring. In Table 1, we provide for all four peripheral countries an assessment of what 
might be the effects of three types of measures that are currently considered:  
  
  A lowering of the interest rate charged on all types of official EU loans (IMF rates cannot 
be lowered) to 3.5 per cent annually; 
  An  extension  of  the  maturity  of  all  types  of  official  EU  loans  to  30  years,  and  the 
transformation of the current Greek IMF Stand-by Agreement into an Extended Fund 
Facility (which would extend the repayment date from 2018 to 2023, as in Ireland);  
  The purchase by the EFSF of all government bonds currently held by the ECB within the 
framework  of  its  Securities  Market  Programme  and  the  retrocession  of  the 
corresponding haircut to the issuing country.
5  
In addition we provide an evaluation of what might be the effect of these measures on market 
sentiment in terms of lower yields, with a drop by 100 basis points.
6    
                                                           
5 We only consider here buy-backs from the ECB, which is feasible without any market interference. We discuss the 
scope for further buy-backs from the market in the next section. Note also that as the current market value of ECB 
holdings is close to their value at the time of purchase, we consider this retrocession to be broadly neutral for the 
profit-and-loss account of the ECB.  
6 Obviously calculations only apply to measures that are currently applicable. For example, we only consider 
maturity extension for the countries (Greece and Ireland) that benefit from financial assistance, and for Portugal 
we only consider the buy-back of current ECB bond holdings from a 30-year 3.5 percent loan.  7 
 
Table 1: Assessment of alternative policies 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
scenario
Three 
policies
100 bps 
lower 
market 
yields
Three 
policies + 
market 
reaction
Three 
policies
100 bps 
lower 
market 
yields
Three 
policies + 
market 
reaction
Greece Optimistic 3.7 -1.3 -1.0 -2.1 8.4 -1.8 -0.8 -2.4
Cautious 10.5 -2.7 -1.0 -3.4 14.5 -3.0 -0.9 -3.6
Ireland Optimistic 0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -1.0 3.7 -0.8 -0.4 -1.1
Cautious 3.3 -0.8 -0.5 -1.2 6.1 -0.9 -0.4 -1.3
Portugal Optimistic 1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 2.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8
Cautious 4.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.8 5.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.8
Spain Optimistic 0.5 -0.6 1.6 -0.6
Cautious 2.7 -0.7 3.8 -0.7
Baseline
Persistent primary surplus needed from 2015 
onwards in order to stabilise the debt/GDP 
ratio at its 2015 level (% of GDP)
Persistent primary surplus needed from 2015 
onwards in order to reduce the debt/GDP ratio 
from its simulated 2014 level to 60 percent of 
GDP by 2034 (% of GDP)
Baseline
Deviation from baseline Deviation from baseline
  
Source: Bruegel simulations.  
Note: Column (d) is not the sum of columns (b) and (c) because the marginal impact of policy measures is 
smaller when market interest rates are lower. 
 
Each of these three measures would clearly help reduce Greece’s debt burden both directly and 
indirectly via lower market interest rates. However, our calculations indicate that even if they 
were all applied together these measures would still be insufficient to return the country to 
solvency,  since  they  would  still  leave  it  with  an  unrealistically  high  primary  budget  surplus 
requirement. 
 
Furthermore, the current stance of ‘no default now, but possible default on bonds issued from 
2013’ is inconsistent and therefore not credible. Up to 2012, markets will price in the default 
option, making it difficult for troubled governments to borrow. From 2013 on, if the stance is 
indeed maintained, the Greek government will not be able to issue bonds. However, a second 
official lending programme for Greece in 2013 would likely find even more political resistance 
from euro-area partners and would further increase the share of official creditors in Greek debt. 
 
We  therefore  consider  that  a  debt  reduction  is  necessary  for  Greece.  On  the  basis  of  our 
scenarios we estimate that to return to a sustainable path and reach a 60 per cent debt-to-GDP 
ratio in twenty years, Greece would need (in addition to the three measures of Table 1) a 30 per 
cent haircut to the marketable public debt.
7 
                                                           
7 This assumes that assistance loans will be exempt from restructuring and that market reaction to the debt 
reduction will result in a drop of the spread vis-à-vis Germany to 200 basis points.  Under these conditions, from 8 
 
 
4. Assessing potential spillovers 
 
The main roadblock to a rapid resolution of the euro area crisis is the difficulty for policy makers 
to  tackle  the  spillover  effects  both  between  banking  and  sovereign  difficulties  and  across 
countries  in  the  absence  of  any  European  sovereign  debt  and  banking  crisis  resolution 
mechanisms.     
 
In order to assess the task at hand, we start from a simplified map of interdependence between 
banks and sovereigns in the periphery countries, and between periphery banks and those in the 
rest of the euro area (Frontpage Figure and Table 2). Although drawing up such a map involves a 
number of assumptions
8, our sense is that it provides a reasonably accurate representation of 
the actual situation.  
Table 2. Estimated exposure to periphery government debt and banking system (€ bn), end-2010 
 
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Total 
Total government debt (at face value) 325 153 142 677 1297
Domestic banks (1) 68 11 19 227 336
Euro-area banks 52 14 33 79 166
Other banks (1) 6 9 5 24 43
Non-banks (both residents and non-residents) (2) 119 97 64 347 627
ECB 50 22 21 0 93
IMF, EU and official lenders 32 0 0 0 32
Ratio of average market value to face value of 
government debt (3)
0.75 0.85 0.90 1.00
Foreign banks' exposure to national banking systems 
(4)
10 119 43 209 381
of which euro-area banks 6 66 37 154 264
Eurosystem lending to banks through the national 
central bank (5) 95 132 41 65 333
of which held by :
 
Sources: Bruegel calculations and estimates using data from BIS, IMF, World Bank, Eurostat, Eurosystem, CEBS, 
Datastream, National Sources, Barclays Capital, Citigroup. 
Note. 
(1) For The total is not equal to the sum of the columns as intra-country exposures are netted out 
(2) Non-Banks is calculated as the unidentified portion of government debt (financial institutions not classified as 
banks are included in this category) 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2015 a 6.0 percent persistent primary surplus (the programme assumption) is needed in our cautious scenario, 
while a 3.6 percent surplus in the optimistic scenario, to reach the 60 percent debt ratio by 2034. 
8 See Darvas, Gouardo, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011) for details. 9 
 
(3) Average weighted discount based on clean price of fixed-rate, non zero-coupon bonds. Note that bonds of some 
of these countries were traded above face value before the crisis and therefore the fall in market price does not 
equal the current discount. For example, most Spanish bonds were also traded above face value, while currently 
some of the bonds are still priced above while the other bonds are priced below, leading to a close to face value 
average. 
(4) As of June 2010; the total also includes intra-country exposures 
(5) "Lending to euro area credit institutions relating to monetary policy operations" by the national central banks; it 
is reasonably to assume that they exclusively lend to domestic institutions. December 2010 for Ireland and 
Portugal; November 2010 for Greece and Spain. 
 
Starting  with  Greece,  our  estimates  indicate  that  the  spillover  effect  from  a  sustainability-
restoring haircut on sovereign debt would result in a manageable impact on banks in the rest of 
the euro area. Some of them would no doubt be in need for recapitalization but even assuming 
this  recapitalisation  would  be  entirely  borne  by  the  public  purse  (a  disputable  choice  and 
therefore an extreme assumption), the impact on the public finances of the partner euro area 
countries would remain limited. Therefore, the fear of domino effect is understandable, but 
excessive. 
 
What  Table  2  also  shows  is  that  spillover  effects  from  crises  in  other  countries  are  clearly 
different. The exposure of euro-area banks to Irish sovereign risk is unimportant and it is really 
exposure to banks that matters. Exposure to Portugal is limited. Only Spain is really systemic, 
through both the sovereign and the banking channels.     
 
5. A comprehensive solution 
 
We see a comprehensive solution to the current crisis as consisting in three planks: 
  A method to reduce the Greek public debt;  
  A plan to restore banking sector soundness;  
  A strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. 
 
Reducing the Greek debt 
 
The calculations presented in sections 2 and 3 imply that it would be preferable to implement 
sooner, rather than later, a significant reduction of the Greek debt.    
 
It would clearly be less disruptive financially, and therefore preferable, to achieve a reduction in 
the debt level through voluntary exchanges than through an outright, across-the-board debt 
restructuring. This justifies giving the EFSF the mission and the financial means to carry out such 
operations on a significant scale. This decision should be taken by heads of state or government 
of the euro area on the occasion of the March European Council, as part of the overall package 10 
 
under  consideration,  and  the  EFSF  should  immediately  buy  from  the  ECB  debt  securities 
purchased within the framework of the Sovereign Market Programme.    
 
A debt exchange however is not without problems. In particular, a voluntary exchange will only 
be marginally effective as long as the EU sticks to its no-restructuring commitment, because, if 
credible, this commitment acts as an incentive to hold rather than sell the asset. In order to 
make debt-exchange schemes effective, public authorities would need to convey to markets 
their  determination  to  reach,  one  way  or  another,  a  reduction  of  public  debt  to  a  level 
compatible  with  sustainability.  This  requires  on  their  part  recognition  of  the  unsustainable 
character of the present policy course and a joint evaluation by the Commission, the ECB and 
the IMF of the required amount of debt reduction.       
 
Restructuring  would  not  be  an  easy  option  either,  both  because  of  its  impact  on  financial 
institutions that have not marked debt securities to market (which is the case of many banks) 
and because of the seniority issue. Currently, bilateral government loans and EFSF loans do not 
enjoy formal seniority status. Yet it would be unthinkable to bail-in those EU members who 
came to the rescue of their ailing partners, especially since the IMF, which provided parallel 
loans, enjoys senior creditor status. If a formal restructuring is needed, we advocate to organise 
it taking inspiration from the mechanism presented in Gianviti et al. (2010).  
 
In both cases, the burden of adjustment should not fall on private bondholders only. First, 
consistent  with  international  experience,  investors  should  be  offered  a  variety  of  new, 
guaranteed instruments as developed in Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2011); second, they should 
be given an opportunity to benefit from an upside in economic conditions through, e.g., GDP-
indexed bonds; third, Greece should be requested to post collateral to guarantee the new debt 
instruments.     
 
Furthermore, Greece and Ireland currently benefit from loans from the EU member states or 
the EFSM/EFSF at relatively high interest rates compared to rates at which these countries or 
institutions are able to borrow on markets. This was intended to signal that these loans should 
not  be  regarded  as  concessional,  partly  in  response  to  fear  of  recourse  to  the  German 
constitutional court for breach of the no bail-out clause. However, high interest rates have 
caused political tensions in the borrowing countries and reduced the domestic ownership of the 
programmes. They have also weakened the credibility of these programmes as they aggravate 
somewhat the sustainability problem the countries are facing. Interest rates on official loans 
should  be  reduced  at  levels  corresponding  to  the  borrowing  cost  of  the  lender,  plus  an 
operational margin, in line with EU assistance to Hungary, Latvia and Romania. The experience 
of  Hungary  suggests  that  countries  may  be  willing  not  to  draw  the  full  amount  of  the 11 
 
preferential  rate  assistance  when  reasonable  market  borrowing  conditions  are  restored,  in 
order to boost market confidence.
9   
 
Strengthening the euro-area banking system 
Assumptions made in our calculations are deliberately cautious. As already indicated, we have 
assumed  further  banks  losses  and  recapitalisation  needs  of  an  order  of  magnitude 
corresponding to adverse-case market forecasts. Even under this assumption, we assess the 
spillover risks to be manageable and conclude that only Greece is in need for a debt reduction. 
We are aware however that our information is incomplete.  
Our estimates of financial interdependence in the euro area show the exposure of peripheral 
banks  to  peripheral  sovereigns  and  of  non-peripheral  banks  to  both  peripheral  banks  and 
sovereigns. What is missing however from our mapping is the exposure of peripheral banks to 
potentially non-performing loans and the resulting risk for banks in the rest of the euro area as 
well as for sovereigns in both peripheral and non-peripheral countries should banks need to be 
recapitalized with public funds. This crucial missing link was supposed to have been filled by the 
European stress test published last July. Unfortunately it was totally discredited by subsequent 
developments in Irish banks and markets have been concerned ever since that the current and 
future situation of banks in the euro area may be far worse than currently admitted. 
The implementation of rigorous and credible stress tests is therefore an absolute priority for the 
euro area. As EU banking supervisors have squandered credibility in the previous round of stress 
tests, we advocate involving the IMF and possibly the BIS in the certification of the next round 
of tests. We suggest that the March European Council adopts the necessary measures to ensure 
that the forthcoming stress test be as rigorous and credible as possible.   
Once such tests have been carried out, euro area countries, not only in the periphery but also in 
the core, must proceed immediately with the restructuring of their banks where necessary, 
which should imply the recapitalization of viable institutions and the closure of nonviable ones. 
To this end, EFSF funding should be made available to governments if necessary. 
The need to restructure some banks in core countries is likely to be necessary especially if bank 
losses turn out to be fairly large in Spain, the only peripheral countries where restructuring 
would, according to our estimates, have a significant spillover effect on the rest of the euro 
area.  
                                                           
9 The Hungarian government launched a 5-year euro denominated bond with a coupon of 6.75 percent in July 2009 
instead of drawing from the approximately 3.2 percent interest-rate EU financial facility. Following the success of 
this issuance it has not drawn anything from the remaining portion of the assistance programmes. 12 
 
Bank restructuring would be greatly accelerated and helped if EU countries introduced special 
bank  resolution  mechanisms  in  their  domestic  legislation  in  line  with  recent  Commission 
proposals. In line with the German proposal for a Competitiveness Pact of February 2011,  we 
advocate that heads of state or government agree in March to put in place such mechanisms 
without delay.      
Beyond the immediate short term, there is an obvious need to put in place a solid European 
framework for banking supervision and resolution. One of the lessons from the crisis is that such 
framework needs to go beyond the coordination between national institutions. Nothing short of 
supra-national bodies in charge of banking supervision and resolution are capable of handling 
the kind of financial interdependence that now exists in Europe. Ideally, such bodies should 
cover all EU countries since they all belong to a single financial market. However, in case this 
proves to be politically unfeasible, euro area countries should go ahead and create their own 
bodies.  
Prior  to  the  crisis,  the  creation  of  EU-  or  euro-area-wide  institutions  in  charge  of  banking 
supervision  and  resolution  was  considered  unacceptable  by  European  countries  because  it 
would amount to the pooling of risks associated with bank failures. What the crisis has shown is 
that  the  absence  of  such  institutions  imposes an  even  bigger  burden sharing  on  countries, 
especially within the euro area where the ECB has been made to act as the lender of last resort 
to banks that may turn out to be insolvent.        
Fostering growth in the peripheral countries 
 
Given the size of public and private debts in the peripheral countries, regaining sustainability 
will require a combination of lower living standards and higher production levels, especially in 
the tradable sector. To this end economic policy should be geared, first and foremost, toward 
implementing domestic reforms aimed at increasing employment and productivity. However, 
even if successful, such reforms will take time to produce their effects. In the meantime, growth 
will remain subdued and even if reduced, debt will stay at high levels. Efforts by the private and 
the public sectors to pay up their debts will have a negative impact on growth, and low growth 
will it make more difficult to reduce debt levels. These countries are also confronted with the 
risk of debt deflation as restoring competitiveness in the tradable sector will require low price 
increases and perhaps even deflation. 
 
In order to break up this vicious circle, peripheral countries need to first stabilize and then 
reduce their debt levels while accelerating the pace of economic reform. But the EU can and 
should play an important role in helping these countries find the narrow policy path to extricate 13 
 
themselves from their debt problems by contributing to foster reforms and growth in these 
countries.  
 
We  have  already  emphasised  the  potential  role  of  better  terms  for  conditional  financial 
assistance  and  the  implementation  of  comprehensive  measures  to  exit  the  debt  deadlock. 
Currently, private investment is withheld and public borrowing costs are heightened due to 
lingering uncertainty about banking sector resolution and sovereign defaults. 
 
But the EU should also do more with the instruments at its disposal. We strongly advocate a 
temporary  refocusing  of  the  structural  funds  earmarked  for  spending  in  the  peripheral 
countries, so that money can be mobilized to support a new growth strategy. As argued in 
Marzinotto  (2011),  this  requires  front-loading  EU  structural  spending  (without  changing  its 
distribution by country), so that it can contribute to fostering reform and growth during the 
most  acute  phase  of  the  adjustment.  This  also  requires  a  joined,  coordinated  approach, 
including  with  the  EU-IMF  programme,  instead  of  the  current  silo  approach  that  hinders 
coherence and effectiveness.  We suggest the European Council in March adopts a programme 
along these lines as part of its Pact for Competitiveness.   
 
In the longer term the EU can also help through making better use of its budget. The discussion 
on the next 2013-2020 financial perspectives is an opportunity for fresh thinking about new 
ways to foster investment in our four countries and other crisis-affected countries, especially in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
For  several  weeks  there  has  been  expectation  among  political  observers  and  market 
participants  that  the  March  European  Council  will  deliver  measures  amounting  to  a 
comprehensive  solution  to  the  euro-area  crisis.  Such  expectation  was  reinforced  by  the 
conclusions of the European Council on 4 February 2011, where heads of state or government 
of the euro area announced their intention to finalize in March a “comprehensive strategy to 
preserve financial stability”.  
 
We have argued that a comprehensive approach to solving the crisis must start by recognizing 
two basic facts. The first is that peripheral countries face a huge challenge in having to adjust 
their weak economies so as to avoid a vicious circle of high private and public debts on the one 
hand and low growth on the other. The second is the interdependence between banks and 
sovereigns not only within peripheral countries but also between these countries and the rest of 
the euro area. 14 
 
 
Based on these two facts, which we document with novel estimates and analyses, we propose a 
comprehensive strategy comprising of three components. The first is the reduction of the public 
debt in Greece, the only euro area country which has become insolvent. The second component 
consists in the cleaning up of banks, wherever needed and simultaneously throughout the euro 
area, based on the results of a rigorous stress test given added credibility by the involvement of 
the IMF. The third component involves fostering adjustment and growth in peripheral countries 
not only through budgetary consolidation and competitiveness-enhancing measures in these 
countries but also through the mobilization and better implementation of EU structural funds.  
 
Too much time has been lost, too much confidence has been dented and too much credibility 
has been squandered in the past year. Building on important decisions already reached, EU 
leaders  should  move  decisively  and  agree  on  a  comprehensive  package  along  the  lines 
suggested here at their forthcoming March summit. This would be a major contribution to the 
cohesiveness and the revival of the euro area.      
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